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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The State, Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
Bryan Rearick, Appellant. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2014-001692 
 
Appeal From Beaufort County 

Carmen T. Mullen, Circuit Court Judge  

Opinion No. 27654 

Heard June 15, 2016 – Filed August 17, 2016 

DISMISSED 
Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of 
Columbia, for Appellant. 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Senior 
Assistant Deputy Attorney General John Benjamin Aplin, 
Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Deborah R. J.
Shupe, all of Columbia, and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie 
Stone, III, of Bluffton, for Respondent.
JUSTICE BEATTY: Following the circuit court judge's declaration of a
mistrial over defense counsel's objection, Bryan Rearick moved to bar subsequent
prosecution of the charge of felony driving under the influence resulting in death 
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("felony DUI") on the ground a second trial would violate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the South Carolina and United States Constitutions.1  Rearick appeals the 
judge's order denying this motion, arguing: (1) the denial of a motion to dismiss 
on double jeopardy grounds is immediately appealable; and, if so, (2) the judge's
declaration of a mistrial was erroneous in that there was no "manifest necessity" to 
justify the ruling. We adhere to well-established appealability precedent and
dismiss the appeal as interlocutory.
I. Factual / Procedural History 
During the late evening hours of May 30, 2010, Rearick was involved in a 
head-on collision on Hilton Head Island that resulted in the death of the driver of 
the other vehicle. Trooper Thomas Summers with the South Carolina Highway 
Patrol was dispatched to the accident scene where he found Rearick receiving 
medical treatment in an ambulance. Trooper Summers followed the ambulance to 
the hospital, interviewed Rearick, and ordered that blood be drawn for forensic 
toxicology analysis. On July 22, 2010, a Beaufort County grand jury indicted 
Rearick for felony DUI.2 
Rearick waived his right to a jury trial and the case proceeded as a bench 
trial on January 30, 2014. At the beginning of the trial, defense counsel raised 
several pretrial motions. Initially, counsel moved to dismiss the case based on the 
State's failure to produce the arresting officer's video recording of the incident in 
violation of section 56-5-2953 of the South Carolina Code.3 Additionally, counsel
moved to suppress the blood sample taken from Rearick on the grounds: (1) it was 
obtained without a warrant and without any exigency in contravention of Missouri 
1  U.S. Const. amend. V; S.C. Const. art. I, § 12. 
2  S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2945(A)(2) (Supp. 2015).
3 Id. § 56-5-2953 (Supp. 2015) (requiring that a person charged with DUI have his
conduct at the incident site recorded on video, including field sobriety tests, unless 
certain exceptions apply); see City of Rock Hill v. Suchenski, 374 S.C. 12, 17, 646 
S.E.2d 879, 881 (2007) (holding dismissal of a DUI charge "is an appropriate 
remedy provided by [section] 56-5-2953 where a violation of subsection (A) is not 
mitigated by subsection (B) exceptions"). 
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v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013);4  (2) it was obtained in violation of section 56-
5-2950,5  which requires that a driver who is accused of DUI be offered a breath 
test before a blood sample is requested; and (3) the chain of custody of the sample 
was fatally defective in that the State failed to produce as a witness the nurse who 
allegedly drew the blood at the hospital.   
The State called Trooper Summers as its primary witness during the pretrial 
hearing.  According to Trooper Summers, the video recording device in his patrol 
car was activated when he turned on his blue lights to respond to the accident   
scene.  When Trooper Summers arrived at the accident site, he encountered the 
EMS, the fire department, and deputies with the Beaufort County Sheriff's 
Department.  However, he could not recall how many individuals were present and 
could not identify anyone by name.  Yet, he specifically remembered speaking 
with Rearick at the scene. 
On cross-examination, Trooper Summers admitted that he did not know 
whether a video recording of the incident had been placed into evidence.  Defense 
counsel further questioned Trooper Summers regarding the contents of his accident 
report as well as the videotaped interview he provided to the South Carolina 
Department of Public Safety about the case.  When it became evident that Trooper 
Summers could not recall the details of the incident, the trial judge took a forty-
five minute recess to permit Trooper Summers to review his notes, the accident 
report, and the DVD of his interview.   
Once Trooper Summers resumed his testimony, he recalled that "[t]here 
were some deputies" at the accident scene.  He estimated that he spent 
approximately thirty to forty-five minutes at the accident scene and that the video 
                                        
4   Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) (holding that, in drunk-driving 
investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not 
constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test 
without a warrant). 
 
5   S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2950 (Supp. 2015) (providing that a person driving a 
motor vehicle in South Carolina is deemed to have consented to a chemical test of 
his breath, blood, or urine if arrested for an offense arising out of acts alleged to 
have been committed while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination 
of the two). 
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recorder in his patrol car was running during that time. After hearing this 
testimony, defense counsel expressed concern that potentially exculpatory 
evidence had not been turned over by the State pursuant to Brady6 and Rule  5,  
SCRCRimP. Counsel explained that the video recording may have contained 
images of Rearick's conduct and demeanor at the time of the accident and that 
Trooper Summers's lapel microphone may have recorded his conversations with 
Rearick. 
The judge determined that a videotape from Trooper Summers's vehicle was 
not required under the circumstances and, thus, denied counsel's motion on that 
basis. However, the judge shared counsel's concern that the other deputies on the 
scene may have videotaped Rearick's conduct and that those recordings were either 
not available or had not been provided to defense counsel. When defense counsel 
moved to dismiss the case based on the State's failure to provide these videotapes, 
the trial judge took the motion under advisement.   
With respect to defense counsel's remaining pretrial motions, the judge
found no violation of the implied consent statute and ruled that any statements
Rearick gave to Trooper Summers at the hospital were admissible. Still, the judge 
took under advisement defense counsel's motion to suppress Rearick's blood 
alcohol content. 
When trial testimony began, the State presented several witnesses to 
establish the chain of custody of Rearick's blood draw at the hospital after the 
accident. At the conclusion of this testimony, the judge found the State had 
established the chain of custody and admitted the toxicology results of Rearick's
blood alcohol content subject to defense counsel's ongoing, yet unresolved, 
objection that the blood evidence was obtained without a warrant.   
The State then called Trooper Scott Ashe, a member of the Multi-
Disciplinary Accident Investigation Team ("MAIT") and an expert in accident 
reconstruction, who testified regarding MAIT's conclusions regarding the accident.  
Following this testimony, defense counsel advised the judge that the State and
Trooper Ashe had referred to documents that were not included in the materials 
turned over to her as part of discovery. The judge recessed to allow the State time
to ascertain what was not included in the discovery materials provided to the 
defense, to obtain the identities of any Beaufort County deputies present at  the  
6 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
16 

  
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
 
 
   
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
accident scene, and to determine whether there were any video recordings of the
accident scene. 
Once the trial reconvened the following week, the judge inquired whether all 
discovery material had been turned over to defense counsel. Defense counsel 
acknowledged that she received the missing MAIT notes the afternoon the court
recessed, but stated she was also provided a number of pages identifying vehicle 
recall information regarding both vehicles involved in the accident. As a result, 
defense counsel moved for a dismissal on the ground that Rearick's due process 
rights had been violated by the State's failure to provide evidence that may have
been exculpatory. In response, the State asserted that a continuance was the more
appropriate remedy. The judge, however, declared a mistrial over the objection of 
defense counsel. 
Nine days later, defense counsel filed a motion to bar subsequent 
prosecution on the ground a second trial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause 
of the South Carolina and United States Constitutions. The judge denied this 
motion. While the judge noted the problems with the State's evidence and
questioned whether certain exculpatory evidence had been turned over to the 
defense, the judge found there was no prosecutorial misconduct. The judge then 
explained that she considered the competing alternative remedies of a continuance, 
a dismissal, and a mistrial. After assessing these options, the judge determined 
there was "a high degree of necessity to declare a mistrial in the instant 
circumstance[s]." Having granted the mistrial "out of manifest necessity," the  
judge ruled that double jeopardy had not attached and, thus, the State was not 
barred from prosecuting the felony DUI charge.   
Rearick appealed this order to the Court of Appeals and, subsequently, filed 
a motion to certify the appeal to this Court pursuant to Rule 204(b), SCACR. The 
State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. This Court granted 
Rearick's motion to certify the appeal and denied the State's motion to dismiss.   
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 II. Discussion 

 
A. Appealability of An Order Denying A Double Jeopardy Claim 

 
1. Arguments 
Rearick readily acknowledges this Court in State v. Miller, 289 S.C. 426, 
346 S.E.2d 705 (1986), expressly held that an order denying a double jeopardy 
claim is not immediately appealable.  However, he contends Miller conflicts with 
the United States Supreme Court's ("USSC") decision in Abney v. United States, 
431 U.S. 651 (1977), which held that a pretrial order denying a defendant's motion 
to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was a "final decision" and is "immediately 
appealable."  Referencing Abney's "substantial analysis of the Federal 
constitutional ban against double jeopardy," Rearick maintains Abney 
"demonstrates why an appeal now is required."  Ultimately, Rearick seeks for this 
Court to overrule Miller and related precedent, reasoning that a state procedural 
rule that conflicts with a defendant's constitutional right not to   be tried twice for   
the same crime cannot prevail. 
2. Abney 
In Abney, the USSC "granted certiorari to determine whether a pretrial order 
denying a motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds  is a final   
decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291."7   Abney v. United States, 431 
U.S. 651, 653 (1977).  The USSC determined that such pretrial orders "constitute 
'final decisions' and thus satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites of § 1291."  Id. at   
662. 
In reaching this conclusion, the USSC prefaced its analysis by recognizing 
that there is no constitutional right to an appeal and there is a "firm congressional 
policy against interlocutory or 'piecemeal' appeals."  Abney, 431 U.S. at 656.  
However, the USSC found that an order denying a defendant's motion seeking a 
                                        
7   Section 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provided:  "The courts of appeals shall have 
jurisdiction from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the 
United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District of 
Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review 
may be had in the Supreme Court." Abney, 431 U.S. at 653 n.1. 
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dismissal on double jeopardy grounds satisfied the prerequisites for fitting within 
"'the small class of cases' that Cohen8 has placed beyond the confines of the final-
judgment rule." Id. at 659. The Court explained that: (1) these orders "constitute
a complete, formal, and, in the trial court, final rejection of a criminal defendant's
double jeopardy claim"; (2) "the very nature of a double jeopardy claim is such that
it is collateral to, and separable from the principal issue at the accused's impending 
criminal trial"; and (3) "the elements of [the double jeopardy] claim are completely
independent of [a defendant's] guilt or innocence."  Id. at 659-60. 
Finally, the USSC emphasized that "the rights conferred on a criminal
accused by the Double Jeopardy Clause would be significantly undermined if 
appellate review of double jeopardy claims were postponed until after conviction 
and sentence." Abney, 431 U.S. at 660. The Court noted that it had long 
"recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects an individual against more 
than being subjected to double punishments. It is a guarantee against being twice 
put to trial for the same offense." Id. at 660-61. The Court concluded, stating "if a 
criminal defendant is to avoid exposure to double jeopardy and thereby enjoy the
full protection of the Clause, his double jeopardy challenge to the indictment must 
be reviewable before that subsequent exposure occurs."  Id. at 662.
Although we appreciate the merit of Abney, it cannot be considered in a 
vacuum since we must analyze Abney in the context of the statutory prerequisites 
for appellate jurisdiction as prescribed by the South Carolina General Assembly.   
3. A Criminal Defendant's Right to Appeal in South Carolina 
In South Carolina, a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to appeal.  
Rather, a defendant's right to appeal is authorized by statutes and appellate court 
rules of procedure. See State v. Wilson, 387 S.C. 597, 599, 693 S.E.2d 923, 924 
(2010) ("The right of appeal arises from and is controlled by statutory law." 
See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) 
(establishing "collateral order doctrine" as an exception to the final-judgment rule; 
describing collateral orders as "that small class [of orders] which finally determine 
claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too 
important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require
that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated"). 
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(citation omitted)).  To appeal, a defendant must be "aggrieved"9  by a decision that 
is statutorily classified as one that is appealable, which generally involves a final 
judgment.  S.C. Code Ann. § 18-1-30 (2014) ("Any party aggrieved may appeal in 
the cases prescribed in this title."); Rule 201(b), SCACR ("Only a party aggrieved 
by an order, judgment, sentence or decision may appeal."); see Rule 201(a), 
SCACR ("Appeal may be taken, as provided by law, from any final judgment, 
appealable order or decision."). 
The General Assembly has expressly limited those decisions that are   
immediately appealable.10   Originally enacted in 1896, section 14-3-330 of the 
South Carolina Code provides, in pertinent part, that an immediate appeal may be 
taken in a law case from: 
(1) Any intermediate judgment, order or decree in a law case involving 
the merits in actions commenced in the court of common pleas and 
general sessions, brought there by original process or removed there 
from any inferior court or jurisdiction, and final judgments in such   
actions; provided, that if no appeal be taken until final judgment is 
entered the court may upon appeal from such final judgment review 
any intermediate order or decree necessarily affecting the judgment 
not before appealed from; 
 
(2) An order affecting a substantial right made in an action when such 
order (a) in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment 
from which an appeal might be taken or discontinues the action, (b)  
grants or refuses a new trial or (c) strikes out an answer or any part 
thereof or any pleading in any action. 
 
9 "[A]n aggrieved party is one who is injured in a legal sense or has suffered an 
injury to person or property."  State v. Cox, 328 S.C. 371, 373, 492 S.E.2d 399, 400 
(Ct. App. 1997). 
10 See S.C. Const. art. V, § 5 ("The Supreme Court shall constitute a court for the 
correction of errors at law under such regulations as the General Assembly may
prescribe."). 
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 (3) A final order affecting 	a substantial right made in any special 
proceeding or upon a summary application in any action after 
judgment. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-330(1), (2), (3) (1976); see State v. Samuel, 411 S.C. 602, 
604, 769 S.E.2d 662, 663 (2015) ("Absent some specialized statute, the immediate 
appealability of an interlocutory or intermediate order depends on whether the 
order falls within [section] 14-3-330 [of the South Carolina Code]." (citation 
omitted)); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 18-1-130 (2014) ("Upon an appeal from a 
judgment the court may review any intermediate order involving the merits and 
necessarily affecting the judgment."). 
 Significantly, appellate court decisions that pre-date and post-date the 
enactment of section 14-3-330 have consistently held that a defendant may appeal 
only after sentence has been imposed.  Without explanation, this Court in 1880 
dismissed a defendant's appeal, holding that the sentence of the defendant in the 
Court of General Sessions is the final judgment, from which alone an appeal may 
be taken. State v. McKettrick, 13 S.C. 439, 439 (1880). 
Twenty years later, the Court applied the holding in McKettrick to dismiss as 
interlocutory an appeal of an order granting a mistrial.  State v. Hughes, 56 S.C. 
540, 35 S.E. 214 (1900).  In so ruling, the Court explained: 
It is a bad practice, and generally condemned, to hear appeals by 
piecemeal, especially in criminal cases; for it is destructive of the 
prompt administration of justice, which is so essential to the peace of 
society.  To allow appeals to be heard from such preliminary rulings 
would enable a party charged with the most serious crime always to   
secure a continuance, when otherwise not entitled to it, by simply 
moving to quash the indictment, and, when his motion is overruled, 
give notice of appeal from such ruling, and thereby stop the trial, as 
was   in the present case.  [But   not so in the appeal at bar, for then   
several justices of this court refused to allow an appeal from a 
preliminary order to stay the wheels of justice.].  Both reason and 
authority require us to hold that this appeal is premature, and must   
therefore be dismissed. 
Hughes, 56 S.C. at 543, 35 S.E. at 215. 
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For decades, this Court relied on Hughes and has consistently held that a
criminal defendant may not appeal until sentence is imposed.  In 1921, the Court 
relied on this authority to find that an order denying a motion to dismiss based on 
double jeopardy grounds following a mistrial provided no exception to well-
established rules of appealability. State v. Wyatt, 115 S.C. 325, 326, 105 S.E. 704, 
704 (1921) (dismissing appeal from an order denying a defendant's plea of former
jeopardy following a mistrial on the ground that there had "not been any final 
judgment, the ruling of his honor, the presiding judge, is not appealable"). 
In 1986, the Court expressly considered the implications of Abney to extant 
appealability rules, including Wyatt. State v. Miller, 289 S.C. 426, 346 S.E.2d 705 
(1986). In Miller, the defendant was convicted of murder, grand larceny, and 
housebreaking; however, the trial judge granted the defendant's motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV"). Id. at 426, 346 S.E.2d at 705.  
The State appealed, and this Court reversed the judge's grant of JNOV and 
reinstated the verdicts of guilty on the charges of murder and grand larceny. Id.
This Court, however, upheld the dismissal of the housebreaking conviction and 
remanded the case for sentencing. Id. (citing State v. Miller, 287 S.C. 280, 337 
S.E.2d 883 (1985)). On remand, Miller moved to bar the capital sentencing
proceeding on double jeopardy grounds. Id. The trial judge denied the motion, 
after which Miller filed a notice of appeal. Id.
This Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice to Miller's right to appeal 
from final judgment. Miller, 289 S.C. at 428, 346 S.E.2d at 706. In so ruling, the
Court relied on its prior decisions holding that a criminal defendant may not appeal
until sentence has been imposed and decisions holding that an order denying a 
double jeopardy claim is not immediately appealable. Id. at 427, 346 S.E.2d at 706
(citing Hughes and its progeny as well as Wyatt). The Court acknowledged 
Miller's argument that the rule prohibiting an immediate appeal from an order 
denying a double jeopardy claim had been overruled by federal decisions, 
including Abney, which hold that appeals based on double jeopardy grounds 
involve final judgments that are directly appealable. Id. Nevertheless, the Court 
found that in both state and federal courts, the right to appeal a criminal conviction 
is conferred by statute and, as noted in Abney, in order to exercise that statutory 
right to appeal, a defendant must come within the terms of the applicable statute.
Id. Significantly, the Court concluded that the cases cited by Miller, including 
Abney, which were based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291 had "no application to state court 
appeals." Id. The Court explicitly adhered to its "view that under § 14-3-330 
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(1976) a criminal defendant may not appeal until after sentence has been imposed."
Id.
Fourteen years later, the Court reaffirmed Miller in  State v. Gregorie, 339 
S.C. 2, 528 S.E.2d 77 (2000). In Gregorie, the defendant was convicted in 
magistrate's court of speeding. Id. at 3, 528 S.E.2d at 78. He appealed to the 
circuit court, which reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding the State failed
to introduce any evidence of the applicable speed limit. Id. On appeal, the Court 
of Appeals initially dismissed the appeal, but reinstated it and affirmed the circuit 
court's ruling.  Id.
This Court overruled Gregorie and another related decision in which the 
Court of Appeals erroneously created an exception to the rule established in Miller
that "a criminal defendant claiming a double jeopardy violation is not exempt from 
the regular appealability requirements." Gregorie, 339 S.C. at 4 n.1, 528 S.E.2d at 
78 n.1. The Court clarified that the test for appealability is "not whether the appeal
involves a double jeopardy claim . . . but whether the party bringing the appeal is 
aggrieved." Id. at 4, 528 S.E.2d at 78. 
Applying this rule, the Court found Gregorie's appeal was immediately
appealable not because it involved a double jeopardy claim, but because Gregorie 
was otherwise aggrieved by the new trial remedy ordered by the circuit court. Id.
The Court noted that the circuit court found the State failed to meet its burden of 
proof and the State's failure to appeal that finding became the law of the case. Id.
Ultimately, the Court found Gregorie correctly asserted that, under those 
circumstances, a second trial in magistrate's court would violate his double 
jeopardy rights.  Id.
Recently, this Court analogized a denial of a request for immunity under the 
South Carolina Protection of Persons and Property Act ("Act") to a denial of a 
motion to dismiss a criminal case on the ground of double jeopardy. State v. Isaac, 
405 S.C. 177, 747 S.E.2d 677 (2013). Citing Miller, the Court held a denial of a
request for immunity under the Act is not immediately appealable. Id. at 185, 747 
S.E.2d at 681. The Court reasoned that "[a]bsent an unambiguous expression of 
legislative intent, we see no reason to alter settled law concerning appealability, 
which additionally would have the illogical effect of elevating a statutory 
immunity claim over one constitutionally based."  Id. at 184, 747 S.E.2d at 680. 
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4. Import of Abney to Appellate Review in State Courts 
Despite the wealth of South Carolina authority to the contrary, Rearick
maintains that Abney is controlling because the federal constitutional right against 
double jeopardy cannot be trumped by a state procedural rule.  
We recognize the split of authority as to the import of Abney in the state 
appellate court realm. Some courts "suggest that the state, as part of its 
constitutional obligation to effectively enforce the double jeopardy bar, must 
provide for an immediate appeal from the trial court's denial of a non-frivolous 
double jeopardy objection." 7 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure  §
27.2(c) (4th ed. 2015).11 In contrast, some courts reject Abney's application to state
11 See, e.g., State v. Choate, 725 P.2d 764, 764 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Abney
and finding that "an interlocutory appeal of a double jeopardy claim is
constitutionally mandated"); State v. Baranco, 884 P.2d 729, 733 (Haw. 1994) 
(adopting Abney rationale and holding that "the collateral order exception to the 
final judgment rule permits an interlocutory appeal of an order denying a pretrial  
motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds"); People v. Torres, 
549 N.W.2d 540, 552 (Mich. 1996) (discussing Abney and concluding that trial 
court's nonfinal decision to grant a new trial was immediately appealable because 
the defendant "could only have avoided the second trial by seeking an immediate 
appeal"); Roberson v. State, 856 So. 2d 532, 533 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) 
(referencing Abney and determining that "[a]n immediate appeal regarding a 
denied double jeopardy claim is permitted"); State v. Milenkovich, 458 N.W.2d
747, 750 (Neb. 1990) (analyzing Abney and concluding that "a defendant must be 
granted the opportunity to raise a claim of double jeopardy prior to being subjected 
to the second trial"); State v. Anderson, 6 N.E.3d 23, 32 (Ohio 2014) (discussing 
Abney and concluding that "an accused would not be afforded a meaningful review 
of an adverse decision on a motion to dismiss and discharge on double-jeopardy 
grounds if that party must wait for final judgment as to all proceedings in order to 
secure review of the double-jeopardy decision"); Commonwealth v. Orie, 22 A.3d 
1021, 1027 (Pa. 2011) (permitting immediate appellate review of trial court's order
determining that petitioner's double jeopardy challenge was frivolous); State v. 
Godette, 751 A.2d 742, 745-46 (R.I. 2000) (citing Abney and recognizing that the 
denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds constitutes an exception
to the general rule regarding appeals in criminal cases). 
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courts on the ground that Abney "is better interpreted as a case interpreting the 
federal statute governing appeals, not the scope of the constitutional prohibition 
against double jeopardy, so that its holding is not binding on state courts 
interpreting their own law." Id.12 
We are persuaded by the holdings in those state jurisdictions that decline to
adopt Abney. A careful review of Abney reveals the USSC's analysis is narrowly
confined to an interpretation of federal law with no indication of a mandatory 
application in state courts. As we interpret Abney, the USSC was not analyzing 
whether a defendant has a constitutional right to appeal the denial of a pretrial 
motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. Rather, the USSC was deciding  
whether such denial was a "final decision" within the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 
the federal appeals statute. Thus, we find those state jurisdictions that adopt the 
12 See, e.g., Jones v. State, 450 So. 2d 186, 187 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) 
(acknowledging split of authority on Abney but taking "the view that a denial of a
pretrial motion based on a plea of double jeopardy is not immediately appealable"); 
State v. Fisher, 579 P.2d 167, 170 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978) (limiting Abney to  
construction of federal appeals statute and ruling that denial of motion to dismiss 
did not constitute a "judgment" within the meaning of a state statute providing for 
appeals in criminal cases); Huff v. State, 599 A.2d 428, 436 (Md. 1991) (finding 
Abney "does not constitutionally mandate interlocutory appeals" and that due 
process does not require the State to provide an immediate appeal); State v. 
Murphy, 537 N.W.2d 492, 495 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting application of 
Abney where state had specific  jurisdictional rule prohibiting review of a pretrial  
order denying defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds); State v.
Nemes, 963 A.2d 847, 848 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (concluding that 
Abney does not embody a constitutional holding and, thus, defendant could not 
appeal as of right from trial court's interlocutory order denying his motion to 
dismiss on double jeopardy grounds); State v. Joseph, 374 S.E.2d 132, 135 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1988) (limiting Abney to federal statute and concluding order denying 
defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was not immediately
appealable); State v. Salzmann, 850 P.2d 1122, 1126 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) ("The 
nature of the Court's analysis and the specificity in its holding persuade us that 
Abney is merely a case of statutory construction of a federal statute and not one 
that establishes a constitutional mandate for interlocutory appeals throughout the
several states."). 
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rationale in Abney misconstrue the holding and extend it beyond what was 
intended by the USSC.13 
Further, we believe an adoption of the rationale in Abney would have dire 
consequences for the future of appellate review in South Carolina.  If we were to
carve out an exception for the denial of a double jeopardy claim, we believe all 
pretrial motions implicating a constitutional right would be subject to immediate 
appeal. 
B. Other Remedies
While the procedural bar of Miller may seem harsh, a defendant is neither 
denied a future appeal nor other remedies. A defendant may still challenge the 
denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds via (1) a petition for 
federal habeas corpus relief, or (2) a petition for this Court to issue an 
extraordinary writ.14 See Livingston v. Murdaugh, 183 F.3d 300, 301 (4th Cir. 
1999) (affirming grant of writ of federal habeas corpus on double jeopardy grounds 
and recognizing that "appeal of a denial of a double jeopardy claim would be futile
because the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that 'an order denying a double 
jeopardy claim is not immediately appealable'" (quoting Miller, 289 S.C. at 427, 
346 S.E.2d at 706)); Gilliam v. Foster, 63 F.3d 287, 291 (4th Cir. 1995) (denying 
State's motion to stay federal district court's grant of habeas corpus for pending 
decision on merits of defendant's double jeopardy claim in state court proceedings; 
stating, "[i]t is also regrettable that, because South Carolina law does not permit an 
interlocutory appeal of the double jeopardy ruling, the appellate courts of that state 
were not the ones to rule on the matter in the first instance"); cf. Paul v. People, 
13 Notably, this Court has expressly recognized that the federal collateral order 
doctrine, upon which Abney is based, is not applied in our state courts. See Capital 
U-Drive-It, Inc. v. Beaver, 369 S.C. 1, 8 n.2, 630 S.E.2d 464, 468 n.2 (2006) 
("Although the federal collateral order doctrine is not applied in our state courts,
we believe the reasoning of these cases is sound.").
14  S.C. Const. art. V, § 5 ("The Supreme Court shall have power to issue writs or 
orders of injunction, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition, certiorari, habeas 
corpus, and other original and remedial writs."); S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-310 (1976) 
("The Supreme Court shall have power to issue writs or orders of injunction, 
mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus and other remedial 
and original writs.").
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105 P.3d 628, 633 (Colo. 2005) (en banc) (concluding that denial of defendant's 
motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was not immediately appealable,
but reviewing the appeal pursuant to appellate court's original jurisdiction). 
III. Conclusion 
Despite Rearick's arguments to the contrary, we conclude that Abney does 
not alter the rule in Miller. Consequently, we dismiss this appeal without
prejudice.15 
APPEAL DISMISSED. 
KITTREDGE and FEW, JJ., concur. PLEICONES, C.J., and HEARN, 
J., concurring in result only. 
15 In view of our decision, we need not address Rearick's remaining issue 
regarding the trial judge's declaration of a mistrial.  See Futch v. McAllister Towing 
of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (declining to
address remaining issues when decision regarding a prior issue is dispositive). 
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CHIEF JUSTICE PLEICONES: We granted certiorari to review a Court of 
Appeals' decision affirming a circuit court order which denied petitioner's ("JWH") 
motion to compel arbitration.  Parsons v. John Wieland Homes and Neighborhoods 
of the Carolinas, Inc., Op. No. 2013-UP-296 (S.C. Ct. App. refiled August 28, 
2013). We reverse. 
FACTS
In 2002, JWH purchased approximately sixty-five acres of land for the 
development of a residential subdivision.  The land was previously utilized as a 
textile-related industrial site.  Following the purchase, JWH demolished and 
removed all visible evidence of the industrial site and removed various 
underground pipes, valves, and tanks remaining from the industrial operations.   
JWH then began selling lots and "spec" homes on the sixty-five acres.  In 2007, 
respondents ("the Parsons") executed a purchase agreement to buy a home built 
and sold by JWH ("the Property").1  Paragraph 21 of the purchase agreement for 
the Property states the purchaser has received and read a copy of the JWH 
warranty ("Warranty") and consented to the terms thereof, including, without 
limitation, the terms of the arbitration clause.  The Parsons initialed below the 
paragraph. Upon executing the purchase agreement, the Parsons were provided a 
"Homeowner Handbook" containing the Warranty.  The arbitration clause is set 
forth in paragraph O of the Warranty's General Provisions.  The Parsons signed an 
acknowledgment of receipt of the handbook dated the same date as the purchase 
agreement.   
In 2008, the Parsons discovered PVC pipes and a metal lined concrete box buried 
on their Property. The PVC pipes and box contained "black sludge," which tested  
1 The Parsons paid $621,102 for the Property, which was financed by the other 
defendants named in the lawsuit. 
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positive as a hazardous substance.  JWH entered a cleanup contract with the South 
Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control.  JWH completed and 
paid for the cleanup per the cleanup contract.2 
The Parsons claim they were unaware the Property was previously an industrial 
site and contained hazardous substances.  In 2011, the Parsons filed the present 
lawsuit alleging JWH breached the purchase agreement by failing to disclose 
defects with the Property, selling property that was contaminated, and selling 
property with known underground pipes.  The Parsons further alleged breach of 
contract, breach of implied warranties, unfair trade practices, negligent 
misrepresentation, negligence and gross negligence, and fraud. 
JWH moved to compel arbitration and dismiss the complaint.  The motion asserted 
that all of the Parsons' claims arose out of the purchase agreement, and the Parsons 
clearly agreed that all such disputes would be decided by arbitration.  The circuit 
court denied the motion and found the arbitration clause was unenforceable for two 
reasons. 
First, the circuit court found that because the arbitration clause was located within 
the Warranty booklet, its scope was limited to claims under the Warranty.  The 
circuit court further found that because the Warranty was limited to claims caused 
by a defect or deficiency in the design or construction of the home, the Parsons' 
claims fell outside the scope of the arbitration clause, and, thus, the arbitration 
clause was unenforceable.   
Second, the circuit court applied the outrageous torts exception to arbitration 
enforcement3 and found that because the Parsons alleged outrageous tortious
2 The cleanup cost JWH approximately $500,000.  In addition to the PVC pipes 
and box, the cleanup revealed a twelve-inch cast iron pipe associated with the prior 
industrial site running the length of the Property.  The cleanup further revealed 
pipes within the foundation of the Parsons' home, some of which were unable to be 
removed; therefore, they were capped and remain on the Property. 
3 See, e.g., Wachovia Bank, Nat. Ass'n v. Blackburn, 407 S.C. 321, 755 S.E.2d 437 
(2014); Timmons v. Starkey, 389 S.C. 375, 698 S.E.2d 809 (2010); Partain v. 
Upstate Auto. Grp., 386 S.C. 488, 689 S.E.2d 602 (2010); Aiken v. World Fin. 
Corp. of South Carolina, 373 S.C. 144, 644 S.E.2d 705 (2007); Chassereau v. 
Global Sun Pools, Inc., 373 S.C. 168, 644 S.E.2d 718 (2007); Simpson v. World 
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conduct, namely, the intentional and unforeseeable conduct of JWH in failing to 
disclose concealed contamination on the Property, the arbitration clause was 
unenforceable.4 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's finding that the scope of the 
arbitration clause was restricted to Warranty claims and declined to address the 
circuit court's application of the outrageous torts exception doctrine.   
We granted JWH's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals'
decision. 
ISSUE 
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the circuit 
court's ruling that the arbitration clause was 
unenforceable? 
LAW/ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeals found the circuit court correctly determined the arbitration 
clause was unenforceable.  We disagree. 
The determination whether a claim is subject to arbitration is reviewed de novo. 
Gissel v. Hart, 382 S.C. 235, 240, 676 S.E.2d 320, 323 (2009).  Nevertheless, a 
circuit court's factual findings will not be reversed on appeal if any evidence 
reasonably supports the findings.  Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 373 S.C. 
14, 22, 644 S.E.2d 663, 667 (2007) (citing Thornton v. Trident Med. Ctr., 
L.L.C., 357 S.C. 91, 94, 592 S.E.2d 50, 51 (Ct. App. 2003)).
The policy of the United States and of South Carolina is to favor arbitration of 
disputes. Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 590, 553 S.E.2d 110, 115 
(2001). Arbitration is a matter of contract law and general contract principles of 
state law apply to a court's evaluation of the enforceability of an arbitration clause.  
Simpson, 373 S.C. at 24, 644 S.E.2d at 668. (citations omitted). 
Fin. Corp. of South Carolina, 373 S.C. 178, 644 S.E.2d 723 (2007); Hatcher v. 
Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., 379 S.C. 549, 666 S.E.2d 294 (Ct. App. 2008).
4 We note the circuit court did not explain how the outrageous torts doctrine 
precluded arbitration of the Parsons' non-tort claims. 
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I. Scope
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that because the arbitration 
clause was located within the Warranty, the scope of the arbitration clause was
limited to claims covered by the Warranty.  We hold the Court of Appeals erred in 
affirming this finding.  
To determine whether an arbitration clause applies to a dispute, a court must 
determine whether the factual allegations underlying the claim are within the scope 
of the arbitration clause. Zabinski, 346 S.C. at 597, 553 S.E.2d at 118 (citing 
Hinson v. Jusco Co., 868 F.Supp. 145 (D.S.C. 1994); S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. 
Great W. Coal, 312 S.C. 559, 437 S.E.2d 22 (1993)).  The heavy presumption in 
favor of arbitrability requires that when the scope of the arbitration clause is open 
to question, a court must decide the question in favor of arbitration.  Landers v. 
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 402 S.C. 100, 109, 739 S.E.2d 209, 213 (2013) (quoting 
Am. Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal Imaging, Inc., 96 F.3d 88, 94 (4th 
Cir. 1996) (quoting Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 867 
F.2d 809, 812 (4th Cir. 1989))).
Paragraph 21 of the purchase agreement provides, in pertinent part: 
21. Warranty and Arbitration. Purchaser and Seller 
hereby agree that, in connection with the sale 
contemplated by this agreement, Purchaser will be 
enrolled in the John Wieland Home and Neighborhoods 
5-20 Extended Warranty program, booklet revision date 
04/06 (JWH Warranty), the JWH Warranty being 
incorporated herein by reference . . . .  PURCHASER 
ACKNOWLEDGES THAT PURCHASER HAS
RECEIVED AND READ A COPY OF THE CURRENT 
JWH WARRANTY AND CONSENTS TO THE 
TERMS THEREOF, INCLUDING, WITHOUT 
LIMITATION, THE BINDING ARBITRATION 
PROVISIONS CONTAINED THEREIN. . . . 
(Capitalization, bold, and underline in original).   
Paragraph O of the Warranty provides, in pertinent part:  
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Mandatory Binding Arbitration. Wieland and 
Homebuyer(s) will cooperate with one another in 
avoiding and informally resolving disputes between 
them. . . . 
Any and all unresolved claims or disputes of any kind or 
nature between [petitioner] and Homebuyer(s) arising out 
of or relating in any manner to any purchase agreement 
with Wieland (if any), this warranty, the Home and/or 
property on which it is constructed, or otherwise, shall be 
resolved by final and binding arbitration conducted in
accordance with this provision, and such resolution shall 
be final. This applies only to claims or disputes that arise 
after the later of: (a) the issuance of the final certificate of 
the occupancy for the home, or (b) the initial closing of 
the purchase of the Home by the initial Homebuyer(s).  
This specifically includes, without limitation, claims 
related to any representations, promises or warranties 
alleged to have been made by Wieland or its 
representatives; rescission of any contract or agreement; 
any tort; any implied warranties; any personal injury; and 
any property damage. 
. . . . 
WIELAND AND HOMEBUYER(S) HEREBY 
ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT THE 
ARBITRATION PROCEDURE SET FORTH HEREIN 
SHALL BE THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE REMEDY 
FOR THE RESOLUTION OF ANY AND ALL 
DISPUTES ARISING AFTER THE INITIAL CLOSING 
OF THE PURCHASE OF THE HOME BY THE 
INITIAL HOMEBUYER(S). WIELAND AND 
HOMEBUYERS HEREBY WAIVE ANY AND ALL 
OTHER RIGHTS AND REMEDIES AT LAW, IN 
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EQUITY OR OTHERWISE WHICH MIGHT 
OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE TO THEM 
IN CONNECTION WITH ANY SUCH DISPUTES. 
(Capitalization, bold, and underline in original).   
The plain and unambiguous language of the arbitration clause provides that all 
claims, including ones based in warranty, be subject to arbitration.  Accordingly, 
we find the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court's finding that 
because the arbitration clause was located within the Warranty, its scope was 
limited to claims covered by the Warranty.  See Jackson Mills, Inc. v. BT Capital 
Corp., 312 S.C. 400, 403, 440 S.E.2d 877, 879 (1994) ("Arbitration clauses are 
separable from the contracts in which they are imbedded." (quoting Prima Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 402, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 
(1967))); see also Zabinski, 346 S.C. at 592, 553 S.E.2d at 116 (finding that like 
other contracts, arbitration clauses will be enforced in accordance with their terms 
(citing Volt Info. Scis. Inc. v. Board of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 
L.Ed.2d 488 (1989))). 
II. Outrageous Torts Exception 
In 2007, this Court created the outrageous torts exception doctrine permitting 
parties whose claims arose out of an opponent's "outrageous" tortious conduct to 
avoid arbitration.  See generally Aiken v. World Fin. Corp. of South Carolina, 373 
S.C. 144, 644 S.E.2d 705 (2007) (establishing, in South Carolina, the outrageous 
torts exception to arbitration enforcement).  The exception established that 
outrageous torts, which were unforeseeable to the reasonable consumer and legally 
distinct from the contractual relationship between the parties, were not subject to 
arbitration. See Aiken, 373 S.C. at 151–52, 644 S.E.2d at 709.  While this Court 
has continued to apply this standalone exception to arbitration enforcement, recent 
United States Supreme Court precedent requires us to reexamine its viability.
In AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court reiterated its position 
that "courts must place arbitration agreements on equal footing with other 
contracts, . . . and enforce them according to their terms[.]" 563 U.S. 333, 339, 131 
S.Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011) (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 163 L.Ed.2d 1038 (2006); Volt Info. 
Scis, Inc., 489 U.S. at 478).  The Concepcion decision further explained that the 
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") permits arbitration agreements to be invalidated 
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by "generally applicable contract defenses," such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability, but not by defenses that apply solely to arbitration or that derive 
their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.5 See 131 
S.Ct. at 1746 (citing Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687, 116 
S.Ct. 1652, 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996) (finding courts may not invalidate arbitration 
agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions); Perry v. 
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492–93, n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 2520, 96 L.Ed.2d 426 (1987) 
(finding state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable only if it 
arose to govern issues concerning contract validity, revocability, and 
enforceability, and state-law principles that take their meaning from the fact that an 
arbitration agreement is at issue does not comport with the requirements of the 
FAA) (citation omitted)); see also Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, --- U.S. ---, 
133 S.Ct. 500, 502, 184 L.Ed.2d 328 (2012) (reiterating that state supreme courts 
must adhere to United States Supreme Court's interpretations of the FAA).  
The Supreme Court recently reconfirmed the obligation state courts have to apply 
Concepcion, and ensure arbitration agreements are "on equal footing with all other 
contracts." See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 468 (2015) ("No one 
denies that lower courts must follow this Court's holding in Concepcion. . . . 
Lower court judges are certainly free to note their disagreement with a decision of 
this Court. . . But the Supremacy Clause forbids state courts to dissociate 
themselves from federal law. . . The Federal Arbitration Act is a law of the United 
States, and Concepcion is an authoritative interpretation of that Act.  
Consequently, the judges of every State must follow it." (citing U.S. Const., Art. 
VI, cl. 2; Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371 (1990); Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 
F.3d 1358, 1363–1364 (CA7 1996), vacated, 522 U.S. 3 (1997))). In finding 
California state courts failed to meet the requirements set forth in Concepcion, and, 
therefore, the arbitration agreement at issue was enforceable, the Supreme Court 
found, in relevant part:
[S]everal considerations lead us to conclude that the 
court's interpretation of this arbitration contract is unique, 
restricted to that field. . . .  The language used by the 
Court of Appeal focused only on arbitration. . . .  
Framing that question in such terms, rather than in 
generally applicable terms, suggests that the Court of 
5 It is undisputed that the arbitration clause at issue is governed by the FAA. 
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Appeal could well have meant that its holding was 
limited to the specific subject matter of this contract— 
arbitration. . . . [T]here is no other principle invoked by 
the Court of Appeal that suggests that California courts 
would reach the same interpretation of [the phrase at 
issue] in other contexts. . . . The fact that we can find no 
similar case interpreting [the phrase at issue] . . . 
indicates, at the least, that the antidrafter canon would not 
lead California courts to reach a similar conclusion in 
similar cases that do not involve arbitration. 
DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 469–71 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2; Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 
546 U.S. at 443; Volt Info. Scis, Inc., 489 U.S. at 476; Perry, 482 U.S. at 493, n.9).
Analogous to DIRECTV, the application of the outrageous torts exception in South 
Carolina is "unique," and "restricted" to the field of arbitration.  Comparable to the 
analysis provided in DIRECTV in finding California courts failed to place 
arbitration on equal footing with other contracts, the language of every outrageous 
torts exception case published by this Court has focused explicitly on arbitration.  
Further, comparable to the analysis in DIRECTV, this Court has never used the 
terminology associated with, or applied the principle of, the outrageous torts 
exception outside the context of arbitration enforcement.6  Because the outrageous 
6 The dissent argues the "outrageous and unforeseeable tort exception to 
arbitration" is a general contract principle but fails to cite any cases outside the 
realm of arbitration where outrageous and unforeseeable conduct has been applied 
as an exception to contract enforcement.  This exception was created in 2007, and 
has only been applied not to void a contract itself, but instead to change the forum
from arbitration to the courtroom based on the outrageous manner in which the 
underlying contract was breached. The Concepcion Court specifically addressed 
the issue of state laws that appear to apply to "any" contract, but in practice have a 
disproportionate impact on arbitration clauses, and held such disproportionate 
application "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objectives."
Therefore, if the dissent were correct that the outrageous torts exception is a 
general contract principle, it is so disproportionately applied in South Carolina that 
it unquestionably stands as an obstacle to the FAA's cited objectives in violation of 
Concepcion. 
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torts exception is not a general contract principle, but instead one that has been 
applied only to arbitration clauses, I find the exception inconsistent with 
Concepcion and its supporting federal jurisprudence.  Accordingly, to the extent 
South Carolina cases apply the outrageous torts exception, I would now overrule 
those cases and find the trial court erred by determining the exception precluded 
enforcement of the arbitration clause.7 
Additionally, the dissent contends our opinion "fails to accurately relay the facts 
and holding of [DIRECTV]." To clarify, the second and third sentences of the 
DIRECTV opinion reveal that the question before the Supreme Court in DIRECTV
was decidedly the same question before this Court: "We here consider a California 
court's refusal to enforce an arbitration provision in a contract.  In our view, that 
decision does not rest 'upon such grounds as exist . . . for the revocation of any 
contract,' and we consequently set that judgment aside."  See DIRECTV, 136 S.Ct. 
at 464. Contrary to the dissent's reliance on one of six grounds provided in 
DIRECTV regarding how the California courts erred, our opinion relies on the 
grounds which lend general guidance as to determining whether an arbitration 
clause is being placed on equal footing with all other contracts.  Accordingly, 
because the DIRECTV analysis we rely upon is not contingent upon the facts, we 
need not provide a detailed recitation thereof.   
In regard to the dissent's proposition that Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. 
Co., 299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d 730 (1989), should be extended to arbitration 
enforcement, nothing in our opinion impacts a homebuyers rights to sue in 
warranty or in tort, and we refuse to extend the narrow substantive holdings in 
Kennedy to the issue of arbitration enforcement before the Court in this case.  
7 We note that JWH argues the Court of Appeals erred by failing to address the 
trial court's ruling as to the outrageous torts exception doctrine.  Because the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the circuit court on the scope issue, we find JWH's argument 
is without merit.  See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 
598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (citation omitted) (noting an appellate court 
need not address remaining issues on appeal when the disposition of a prior issue is 
dispositive).  Further, because we find the circuit court erred in its ruling as to the 
scope of the arbitration clause, we address the outrageous torts issue without a 
remand to the Court of Appeals in the interest of judicial economy.  See Furtick v. 
S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 352 S.C. 594, 599, 576 S.E.2d 146, 
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III. Unconscionability  
As an additional sustaining ground, the Parsons ask this Court to find the
arbitration clause is unconscionable. Cf. I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 
S.C. 406, 419–20, 526 S.E.2d 716, 723 (2000) (noting the decision to review an 
additional sustaining ground is discretionary).  We find the Parsons' arguments as 
to unconscionability are without merit.  See Simpson, 373 at 25, 644 S.E.2d at 668– 
69 (explaining unconscionability requires courts to focus generally on whether the 
arbitration clause is geared towards achieving an unbiased decision by a neutral 
decision-maker (citing Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 
1999))); Carolina Care Plan, Inc. v. United HealthCare Servs., Inc., 361 S.C. 544, 
554, 606 S.E.2d 752, 757 (2004) (citation omitted) ("Unconscionability has been 
recognized as the absence of meaningful choice on the part of one party due to 
one-sided contract provisions, together with terms that are so oppressive that no 
reasonable person would make them and no fair and honest person would accept 
them."). 
CONCLUSION
We reverse the Court of Appeals' decision upholding the circuit court's finding that 
because the arbitration clause was located within the Warranty, its scope was 
limited to the terms of the Warranty.  Further, while the majority of this Court 
finds the outrageous torts exception to arbitration remains viable, I would hold the 
exception cannot survive in light of Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740.  Finally, we find 
the Parsons' unconscionability argument is without merit.  Accordingly, we find 
the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court's refusal to enforce the 
arbitration clause. 
The Court of Appeals' decision is therefore 
REVERSED.  
KITTREDGE, J., concurs.  HEARN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part in a separate opinion in which BEATTY, J., concurs.  Acting Justice Jean 
H. Toal, dissenting in a separate opinion. 
149 (2003) (addressing the merits of a claim in the interest of judicial economy).   
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JUSTICE HEARN:  With great respect,  I  concur in  result with the majority.
However, I write separately to concur in part and dissent in part from both the
majority opinion and the dissent. 
I agree with the majority that the scope of the arbitration clause covers the 
claims against JWH.  However,  I  also agree  with the dissent that the outrageous 
and unforeseeable torts exception remains a viable principle of law after
Concepcion,8 because it embodies a generally applicable contract principle:
effectuating the intent of the parties. In my opinion, abolishing the "exception"— 
allegedly applicable only to arbitration9—could lead to absurd results, such as 
forcing parties to arbitrate behavior that they clearly did not contemplate upon 
entering the contract or arbitration agreement. See Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, 
Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1214 (11th Cir. 2011) ("Even though there is [a] presumption 
in favor of arbitration, the courts are not to twist the language of the contract to 
achieve a result which is favored by federal policy but contrary to the intent of the 
parties." (citation omitted) (internal quotation and alteration marks omitted)); see 
also, e.g., Koon v. Fares, 379 S.C. 150, 155, 666 S.E.2d 230, 233 (2008) 
(explaining a contract "interpretation which establishes the more reasonable and 
probable agreement of the parties should be adopted while an interpretation leading 
to an absurd result should be avoided"); cf. Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Rollison, 378 
S.C. 600, 609, 663 S.E.2d 484, 488 (2008) (stating the Court will refuse to 
interpret statutory language in a manner that would lead to an absurd, and clearly 
uncontemplated, result (citation omitted)). 
8 AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
9 To the extent the majority may consider this exception only applicable to 
arbitration, I wish to note my disagreement and clarify my understanding of the 
concept. I believe, despite its name, the legal principles underlying the outrageous 
and unforeseeable torts exception are equally applicable to contracts and 
arbitration agreements. Thus, if a litigant files a breach of contract suit for 
behavior not contemplated by the parties upon entering the contract, I believe this 
exception would provide the opposing party a defense to the breach of contract
claim. Similarly, if a litigant attempts to defend himself by asserting an arbitration 
defense to a claim that does not fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement 
(perhaps because it was not contemplated by the parties upon entering the 
contract), I likewise believe this exception could provide the opposing party a 
defense to the demand for arbitration. 
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Nonetheless, I disagree with the dissent that the outrageous and 
unforeseeable torts exception applies here to bar JWH's demand for arbitration. In 
a residential purchase agreement, it is entirely foreseeable that a seller would fail to
disclose defects with the property.10 
More importantly, in examining the scope of arbitration agreements, this 
Court has traditionally considered whether a "significant relationship" exists 
between the claims asserted and the contract in which the arbitration clause is 
contained. Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 598, 553 S.E.2d 110, 
119 (2001); see also Aiken v. World Fin. Corp. of S.C., 373 S.C. 144, 150, 644 
S.E.2d 705, 708 (2007) (stating the significant relationship test is not a mere "but-
for" causation standard). Thus, the Court must determine "whether the particular 
tort claim is so interwoven with the contract that it could not stand alone."  
Zabinski, 346 S.C. at 597 n.4, 553 S.E.2d at 119 n.4. In fact, the Court has 
specifically stated the outrageous and unforeseeable torts exception sought only "to 
distinguish those outrageous torts, which although factually related to the 
performance of the contract, are legally distinct from the contractual relationship 
between the parties." Aiken, 373 S.C. at 152, 644 S.E.2d at 709. 
Accordingly, in this instance, I believe the correct inquiry is whether JWH's
alleged fraud in failing to disclose the presence of hazardous waste on the property 
10 Numerous lawsuits in our state involve a seller's failure to disclose. See, e.g., 
Lawson v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank of S.C., 259 S.C. 477, 193 S.E.2d 124 (1972) 
(involving a homebuyer's complaint that the seller failed to disclose that the
residence's lot was filled with unsuitable material and "capped" with clay); Cohen 
v. Blessing, 259 S.C. 400, 192 S.E.2d 204 (1972) (involving a homebuyer's 
complaint that the seller deliberately failed to disclose that the residence was 
infested with insects); Winters v. Fiddie, 394 S.C. 629, 716 S.E.2d 316 (Ct. App. 
2011) (involving a homebuyer's complaint that the seller failed to disclose the 
presence of toxic mold in a house prior to closing).  As such, it cannot come as a
complete shock should a particular seller fail to disclose a defect to a particular 
buyer. In fact, the General Assembly has expressly provided a remedy in such an 
event, further supporting the idea that a seller's failure to disclose is a foreseeable, 
albeit regrettable, possibility. See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 27-50-65 (2007) 
(permitting recovery of actual damages, court costs, and attorneys' fees against a 
seller who knowingly fails to disclose "any material information on the disclosure 
statement that he knows to be false, incomplete, or misleading"). 
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is essentially a freestanding tort that is not significantly related to the sales contract
and arbitration agreement between JWH and the Parsons. I would find there is a
significant relationship between the claim and the contract in which the arbitration
agreement is contained. The Parsons could not bring their claim against JWH 
absent the sales contract, as the claim is entirely reliant on the parties' statuses 
under the contract. In other words, absent the sales contract, JWH would be under 
no duty to disclose these particular defects with the property to the Parsons or any
other third-party.
Therefore, I would find the outrageous and unforeseeable torts exception, 
while a viable principle of law, does not apply to bar JWH's demand for arbitration 
here due to the significant relationship between the claims and the contract in 
which the arbitration agreement is contained. Accordingly, I concur in result with 
the majority to reverse the denial of JWH's motion to compel arbitration.
BEATTY, J., concurs. 
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ACTING JUSTICE TOAL: I respectfully dissent.  I disagree that the outrageous 
and unforeseeable tort exception is not a general contract principle.  Accordingly, I 
believe the majority errs in overruling previous South Carolina cases that apply the 
exception. Moreover, the majority's opinion undermines the protections the Court 
has previously extended to homebuyers in Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & 
Manufacturing Co.11 and its progeny. See, e.g., Smith v. Breedlove, 377 S.C. 415, 
422–24, 661 S.E.2d 67, 71–72 (2008).  Therefore, I dissent. 
I. General Contract Principles 
In "overrul[ing] the judiciary's long-standing refusal to enforce agreements
to arbitrate," the United States Supreme Court has held numerous times that 
arbitration agreements must be placed "upon the same footing as [all] other 
contracts." Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Accordingly, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)12 "imposes certain rules of 
fundamental importance, including the basic [contract] precept that arbitration 'is a 
matter of consent, not coercion.'" Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 
559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010) (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479); see also Volt, 489 U.S. 
at 478 ("[T]he FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed 
to do so, nor does it prevent parties who do agree to arbitrate from excluding 
certain claims from the scope of their arbitration agreement." (internal citations 
omitted)).13  Similarly, as with all other contracts, when a court interprets an 
arbitration agreement, "'the parties' intentions control'" such that the court's 
interpretation merely "'give[s] effect to the contractual rights and expectations of 
the parties.'" Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 681–82 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479; 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 
(1985)). 
11 299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d 730 (1989).
12 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
13 However, given the strong federal and state policies favoring arbitration, a court 
should generally compel arbitration "[u]nless [it] can say with positive assurance 
that the arbitration clause is not susceptible to any interpretation that covers the
dispute." Partain v. Upstate Auto. Grp., 386 S.C. 488, 491, 689 S.E.2d 602, 603– 
04 (2010).
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As I read our precedents, the so-called "outrageous and unforeseeable tort 
exception to arbitration" is merely a label for this Court's application of a long-
standing contract principle—effectuating the parties' contractual expectations.  In 
the past, when the Court invoked the exception, it merely recognized that upon 
executing the arbitration agreement, the parties did not intend to arbitrate claims 
arising out of the other party's extreme and unforeseeable conduct.  Aiken v. World 
Fin. Corp. of S.C., 373 S.C. 144, 151, 644 S.E.2d 705, 709 (2007) ("Because even 
the most broadly-worded arbitration agreements still have limits founded in 
general principles of contract law, this Court will refuse to interpret any arbitration 
agreement as applying to outrageous torts that are unforeseeable to a reasonable 
consumer in the context of normal business dealings."); see also Landers v. Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp., 402 S.C. 100, 115, 739 S.E.2d 209, 217 (2013) ("[E]ven the 
broadest of [arbitration] clauses have their limitations."); Partain v. Upstate Auto. 
Grp., 386 S.C. 488, 492, 689 S.E.2d 602, 604 (2010).  In other words, absent 
evidence to the contrary, parties do not intend to arbitrate wholly unexpected, 
outrageous behavior. Timmons v. Starkey, 389 S.C. 375, 379, 698 S.E.2d 809, 811 
(2010) (Toal, C.J., dissenting) ("An arbitration clause does not cover every 
potential suit between the signing parties; instead, it only applies to those claims
foreseeably arising from the contractual relationship.").14  Forcing the parties to 
arbitrate claims based on such behavior would be contrary to their intent in 
entering the arbitration agreement, and would impose the court's will upon the 
parties. 
Accordingly, I disagree with the majority's assertions that the outrageous 
and unforeseeable tort exception to arbitration is not a general contract principle.  
In my view, the exception treats arbitration agreements and contracts precisely 
14 Cf. Landers, 402 S.C. at 115, 739 S.E.2d at 217 (finding claims arbitrable in part
because the plaintiff provided a "clear nexus" between the contract, its arbitration 
clause, and the causes of action, such that they were all significantly related);
Mibbs, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Rev., 337 S.C. 601, 608, 524 S.E.2d 626, 629 (1999) 
(finding that contractual duties may be affected by foreseeable actions taken in the 
future); S.C. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Thornton-Crosby Dev. Co., 303 S.C. 74, 78–79, 399 
S.E.2d 8, 11–12 (Ct. App. 1990) (acknowledging that a party could defend itself 
from a breach of contract suit in part if a consequence of the breach was
unforeseeable). 
43 

  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
equally. Specifically, the exception ensures that a court will consider the parties'
intentions when it determines the scope of the agreement at issue, be it contract or 
arbitration agreement.  See Chassereau v. Global Sun Pools, Inc., 373 S.C. 168, 
172, 644 S.E.2d 718, 720 (2007) ("Although we are constrained to resolve all 
doubts in favor of arbitration, this is not an absolute truism intended to replace 
careful judicial analysis.  While actions taken in an arrangement such as the one 
entered into by these parties might have the potential to generate several legal 
claims and causes of action, we have no doubt that [the plaintiff] did not intend to 
agree to arbitrate the claims she asserts in the instant case [because those claims 
are based on the defendant's allegedly outrageous and unforeseeable behavior]."); 
cf. Volt, 489 U.S. at 478 ("[T]he FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when 
they have not agreed to do so . . . ." (citations omitted)).
In fact, many courts have recognized that outrageous and unforeseeable 
conduct is generally not arbitrable.  See, e.g., Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 
657 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that claims of false imprisonment, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, spoliation of evidence, invasion of 
privacy, and fraudulent misrepresentation were outside the scope of an arbitration 
clause in an employment agreement between the cruise line and a crewmember 
who claimed she was drugged and raped by fellow crewmembers); cf. Landers v. 
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 402 S.C. 100, 108, 739 S.E.2d 209, 213 (2013) ("Whether 
a party has agreed to arbitrate an issue is a matter of contract interpretation and a 
party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not 
agreed so to submit." (emphasis added) (quoting Am. Recovery Corp. v. 
Computerized Thermal Imaging, Inc., 96 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 
(1960))) (internal marks omitted)).  The majority suggests that considering the 
scope of the arbitration agreement is a new concept "created in 2007," and that 
South Carolina disproportionately invalidates arbitration agreements based on 
conduct falling outside the scope of the contract.  I strongly disagree with this 
contention. Cf. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684 (rejecting the view that once an 
entitlement to arbitration is established, any claim may be arbitrated).  Merely 
because this Court attributed a formal label to the concept of considering the scope 
of an arbitration agreement is no reason to invalidate the rationale underlying the 
label. 
It appears that the majority approves of considering the parties' intentions in 
determining the scope of the agreement, but takes issue with the exception because 
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of its label—the outrageous and unforeseeable tort exception to arbitration. 
However, this label is a misnomer.  The analysis underlying the exception— 
defining the scope of the agreement by effectuating the parties' contractual 
expectations—is equally applicable to contracts and arbitration agreements. 
Accordingly, I disagree that the Court should abolish this analytical process 
in future cases. Abolishing the outrageous and unforeseeable tort exception 
effectively places arbitration agreements in a position of vast superiority to all 
other contracts. In essence, arbitration agreements now become "super contracts," 
in which the parties' intentions in outlining the scope of their agreement are 
irrelevant, and courts must now indiscriminately send parties to arbitration 
regardless of their intentions. As stated previously, this blind imposition of 
judicial might on the parties not only lacks a legal foundation, but takes the 
Supreme Court's directives to enforce arbitration agreements to irrational lengths.  
See Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684 ("It falls to courts and arbitrators to give effect 
to the[] contractual limitations, and when doing so, courts and arbitrators must not 
lose sight of the purpose of the exercise: to give effect to the intent of the parties." 
(emphasis added)).15 
15 In  an effort to  shore  up  its analysis, the majority cites  to the recent Supreme
Court holding in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia,  136  S. Ct. 463 (2015).  However,  
despite its use of selective quotes from the opinion, the majority fails to accurately
relay the facts and holding of that case. As the Imburgia opinion sets forth in
detail, in 2005, the California Supreme Court held that a waiver of class arbitration 
in a consumer contract of adhesion is unconscionable under California law, and 
thus unenforceable. Id. at 466 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 
1100 (Cal. 2005)). However, in AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, the 
Supreme Court specifically invalidated California's so-called Discover Bank rule,  
holding that it was preempted by the FAA because it stood "'as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'"
Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011)).  
Nonetheless, in Imburgia, the California Court of Appeal held that California law 
"'would find the class action waiver unenforceable,'" citing to the  Discover Bank
rule. Id. at 467 (quoting Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 194 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2014)). 
On appeal, the Supreme Court invalidated the decision of the California
Court of Appeal, stating, among various other rationale: 
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II. Application 
South Carolina courts have applied the outrageous and unforeseeable tort 
exception sparingly and are reluctant to declare the tortious conduct underlying a 
lawsuit to be unrelated to the contract containing the arbitration agreement.16  In 
Fifth, the Court of Appeal reasoned that invalid state arbitration
law, namely the Discover Bank rule, maintained legal force despite
this Court's holding in Concepcion.  The court  stated that  "[i]f  we  
apply state law alone to the class action waiver, then the waiver is 
unenforceable." And at the end of its opinion, it reiterated that "[t]he 
class action waiver is unenforceable under California law, so the 
entire arbitration agreement is unconscionable." But those statements 
do not describe California law. The view that state law retains 
independent force even after it has been authoritatively invalidated by
this Court is one courts are unlikely to accept as a general matter and 
to apply in other contexts.
Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 470 (emphasis added) (internal citations and alteration
marks omitted). Thus, Imburgia stands  merely for the unsurprising proposition 
that the Supremacy Clause forbids state courts from ignoring the specific holdings 
of the Supreme Court. 
16 In fact, this Court has cautioned that the exception should not be used as an 
"end-run" around arbitration clauses. See Partain, 386 S.C. at 494, 689 S.E.2d at 
605. Only when the parties truly and clearly did not contemplate arbitrating a 
particular claim should a court decline to enforce an otherwise proper arbitration 
agreement on the grounds that the claim is not significantly related to the contract.  
Id. at 494–95, 689 S.E.2d at 605; compare Landers, 402 S.C. at 100, 739 S.E.2d at 
209 (finding the slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims
brought by a man who was fired significantly related to his employment contract 
that specified grounds and remedies for rightful and wrongful termination because 
the offensive comments related to the man's purported inability to do his job), with
Partain, 386 S.C. at 488, 689 S.E.2d at 602 (finding that a claim involving a "bait 
and switch" in relation to a used car purchase was outrageous and unforeseeable
and thus was not subject to arbitration), and Chassereau, 373 S.C. at 168, 644 
S.E.2d at 718 (finding a claim for extensive public harassment of a customer was
not significantly related to the contract to pay for a pool, and thus was not subject 
to arbitration).
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determining whether the exception applies, a court should focus on the parties'
intent, the foreseeability of a particular claim when the parties entered into the 
agreement, and whether or not the specific claims fall within the scope of the 
arbitration agreement, either expressly or because they significantly relate to the 
contract. See Chassereau, 373 S.C. at 172–73, 644 S.E.2d at 720–21.
Here, the gravamen of the complaint is that JWH failed to disclose certain
defects with the property, including industrial pipes and a concrete box containing 
a hazardous substance. As explained further, infra, it is unreasonable and 
unforeseeable that JWH would fail to clean up such extreme pollution on a 
residential construction site. Cf. Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 344, 384 S.E.2d at 736 ("We 
have made it clear that it would be intolerable to allow builders to place defective 
and inferior construction into the stream of commerce." (citing Rogers v. Scyphers, 
251 S.C. 128, 135–36, 161 S.E.2d 81, 84 (1968))).  Therefore, it is inconceivable 
that the parties contemplated claims involving hazardous pollution on the 
construction site when executing their arbitration agreement.  Accordingly, I would 
not compel arbitration of these particular claims, as doing so would not fulfill the 
parties' expectations in entering the arbitration agreement. 
III. Residential Construction Arbitration Agreements 
Although the primary issue in this appeal involves the enforceability of an 
arbitration agreement, the entire lawsuit arose due to extreme defects concealed 
during JWH's construction of a home.  Because the case involves residential 
construction, the protections this Court has previously extended to homebuyers in 
Kennedy and the like impose an extra "gloss" on the relevant analysis, one which 
the majority overlooks. 
South Carolina courts have historically been inclined to expand general 
contract and tort principles to protect innocent homebuyers.  See, e.g., Kennedy, 
299 S.C. at 343–44, 384 S.E.2d at 735–36; Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 
497, 501–03, 229 S.E.2d 728, 730–31 (1976) ("Disparity in the law should be 
founded upon just reason and not the result of adherence to stale principles which 
do not comport with current social conditions."); Rogers v. Scyphers, 251 S.C. 128, 
132–34, 135–36, 161 S.E.2d 81, 83, 84–85 (1968).  To that end, South Carolina 
courts embraced the maxim caveat venditor, or "seller beware," and abolished the 
requirement of strict privity between a home purchaser and a homebuilder.  
McCullough v. Goodrich & Pennington Mortg. Fund, Inc., 373 S.C. 43, 53, 644 
S.E.2d 43, 49 (2007); Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 343, 344–45, 384 S.E.2d at 735, 736; 
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see also Sapp v. Ford Motor Co., 386 S.C. 143, 147–48, 687 S.E.2d 47, 49–50 
(2009) (discussing Kennedy and noting that its holding "followed cases from
around the country expanding protections afforded to homebuyers and imposing 
tort liability on residential homebuilders").  Thus, in cases involving residential 
construction contracts, general contract and tort principles occasionally give way to 
the State's dual policies of protecting the homebuyer and making it easier for that 
buyer to pursue claims against the builder or seller. 
Because Kennedy and its progeny explicitly apply only to residential 
construction contracts, this Court has not previously had occasion to address how 
this line of cases applies to residential construction arbitration agreements. 
However, again, the Supreme Court has held numerous times that arbitration 
agreements must be placed "upon the same footing as [all] other contracts."  Volt, 
489 U.S. at 478 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, I 
conclude that South Carolina's longstanding policy of protecting innocent 
homebuyers extends to arbitration agreements involving residential construction as 
well. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492–93 n.9 (1987) ("Thus state law, 
whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable [to arbitration agreements] if
that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and 
enforceability of contracts generally. . . .  A court may not, then, in assessing the 
rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that 
agreement in a manner different from that in which it otherwise construes 
nonarbitration agreements under state law." (bold emphasis added)).17 
Accordingly, as in all other residential construction cases, I would extend this 
Court's protection to the Parsons, as the innocent homebuyers.18 
In the arbitration context, I believe this protective "gloss" specifically 
applies to whether the homebuilder's conduct is outrageous, unforeseeable, and not 
contemplated by the parties when entering into the residential construction 
contract. Thus, as applied here, Kennedy and its progeny lead me to find that 
17 Were I to conclude that Kennedy's protections did not extend to homebuyers 
whose contracts involved an arbitration agreement, I would place those arbitration 
agreements in a position of vast superiority over contracts, rather than treating 
them equal to contracts. 
18 In failing to extend Kennedy's protection  to the Parsons here, the majority  
opinion undermines our extensive precedent in the residential construction context.
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JWH's failure to disclose the extreme pollution and defects with the property was 
not only unreasonable, but unforeseeable as well.  As stated, supra, I would 
therefore refuse to compel arbitration between the parties, as claims based on such 
outrageous conduct by a homebuilder surely were not contemplated by the parties. 
IV. Conclusion 
I believe the outrageous and unforeseeable tort exception to arbitration is 
merely a label for a general contract principle:  effectuating the contractual 
expectations of the parties.  Therefore, I would adhere to the Court's previous 
holdings that the exception may invalidate an arbitration agreement if certain 
criteria are met.  Further, I would extend the protections of Kennedy and its 
progeny to arbitration agreements involving residential construction.  Accordingly, 
I dissent. 
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